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Decided on September 25, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Savy Properties 26 Corp., Petitioner,
against
Barbara James, ET AL., Respondents.

Index No. 54591/20
Michael L. Weisberg, J.
The following efiled documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers 3; 59 (motion
no. 2), were read on this motion to vacate the stay effectuated by the ERAP statute.
This is a holdover summary eviction proceeding predicated on termination of an
unregulated tenancy. Respondent applied for relief under the Emergency Rental Assistance
Program, resulting in a stay of the proceeding. Petitioner has moved to vacate the stay. For
the reasons below, the motion is denied.
"Public policy determined by the legislature is not to be altered by a court by reason of
its notion of what the public policy ought to be" (Desrosiers v Perry Ellis Menswear, LLC, 30
NY3d 488, 497 [2017] [internal citations omitted]). It is not the role of the court to "second
guess" the determination of the legislature; the court may not substitute its own determination
therefor (Cohen v State of New York, 94 NY2d 1, 1415 [1999]). "A statute must be read and

given effect as it is written by the legislature, not as the court may think it should or would
have been written if the legislature had envisaged all of the problems and complications
which might arise in the course of its administration; and no matter what disastrous
consequences may result from following the expressed intent of the legislature, the judiciary
cannot avoid its duty" (McKinney's Cons Law of NY, Statutes § 73, Comment).
The COVID19 Emergency Rental Assistance Program of 2021 (L 2021, ch 56, part
BB, subpart A, § 8) mandates a stay of nonpayment and holdover eviction proceedings where
the household subsequently applies for ERAP benefits, until it is determined whether the
household is eligible for those benefits. One may question the wisdom or fairness of a policy
that stays an eviction proceeding predicated on, for example, expiration of an unregulated
lease, pending an agency's determination of application for rent arrears. It may be that the
statute, in certain instances, has turned out to be a "disaster." But is not for the court to
deviate from the intent of the legislature to ameliorate the statute's unexpected effects.
Neither the statutory text, nor in this court's opinion, an examination of the spirit, purpose, or
history of the legislation, allow for any other conclusion as to the legislative intent except
that both nonpayment and holdover proceedings are stayed until there is a determination of
eligibility from the Office of Temporary [*2]and Disability Assistance.[FN1], [FN2]
The statute does not run afoul of the Due Process Clause or otherwise implicate due
process concerns. Unlike the COVID19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention
Act, the statute at issue in Chrysafis v Marks (— US —, 141 S Ct 2482 [2021]), the ERAP
statute does not permit a tenant to "be a judge in his own case." In stark contrast to the
"hardship declaration" in CEEFPA, a tenant's ERAP application is explicitly subject to an
eligibility determination. In other words, the tenant is not the judge of his own case, OTDA
is.[FN3]
The court does not agree that a determination as to an applicant's eligibility for ERAP
may be made by the court. The statute itself is conspicuously bereft of any language
permitting the interpretation that the court may determine ERAP eligibility. Moreover, the
statute specifically refers to OTDA when discussing eligibility determinations: "Prior to
making an eligibility determination, the commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall
undertake reasonable efforts to obtain the cooperation of landlords and utility providers to
accept payments from this program" (L 2021, ch 56, part BB, subpart A, § 9[2][b]). The
court is not empowered to make determinations as to eligibility.[FN4]
The court has considered arguments concerning "futility" and "absurdity" and finds

them unavailing.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that upon a determination of eligibility by OTDA, Petitioner may request
restoration of the proceeding by letter/correspondence uploaded to NYSCEF, with supporting
documentation, and courtesy email notification to the court.
This is the court's decision and order.
Dated: September 25, 2022
________________________________
Michael L. Weisberg, JHC
Footnotes
Footnote 1:As it happens, the legislature revisited the ERAP statute almost five months after
its enactment, amending it to exempt from the stay of proceedings those cases involving what
could be colloquially referred to as "nuisance conduct" (L 2021, ch 417, part A, § 6). That the
legislature amended the ERAP statute to include a "nuisance" exception but did not create an
exception for other holdover proceedings, even where payment of arrears would not resolve
the proceeding, is indicative of its intent that those proceedings should be stayed.
Footnote 2:As this court held in 22 Hawthorn Street LLC v Lendor, 308930/21 [Civ Ct,
Kings County 2022], proceedings under RPAPL 713 are not "holdover" proceedings, strictly
speaking, and thus the stay does not apply to proceedings based on allegations that the
occupants are licensees, squatters, in possession incidental to employment, etc.
Footnote 3:On this point it should be remembered that summary eviction proceedings are
creatures of statute. There is no constitutional right to a summary eviction remedy. It cannot
be doubted that Article 7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law could be
repealed without any constitutional impediments. One could even go so far as to surmise that,
because of the existence of a common law ejectment remedy, such a repeal could be made to
apply to pending summary eviction proceedings without raising constitutional concerns (cf.
Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 275 [1994] ["Changes in procedural rules may
often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about
retroactivity"] [internal citations omitted]). Thus, what offended the constitution in Chrysafis
was not the stay of proceedings itself but that the tenant's assertions were not subject to any
form of review. A tenant's ERAP application is not similarly free from question.
Footnote 4:It is not that the court can never assess "eligibility" for a rental assistance
program. In matters committed to the court's discretion, such as determining whether good
cause exists to stay execution of a warrant beyond that date contemplated by the parties in an

agreement, the court may determine, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a tenant
is not eligible for a "one shot deal" because of the absence of future ability to pay rent, and
that a tenant is not eligible for FHEPS because there is no open public assistance case or
minor child in the household.
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